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Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States,
and the Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective
I.

Overview of State and Federal Systems:
Where, When, and What Kinds of Guidelines?
A. Jurisdictions that Have, Once Had, Are
Considering, or Rejected Guidelines
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II.

Not All Guidelines Are AlikeMajor Variations

The Changing Purposes of Sentencing Guidelines
A. Initial Goals
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Evolving Goals
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IV.
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What's the Alternative? Comparing Guidelines to
Other Systems, Past, Present, and Future
A. Indeterminate Sentencing
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(and Common Variations)
"Legislative-Determinate" Sentencing
Emerging Sentencing Theories

Conclusion
This article examines and compares the evolution, successes, and failures of sentencing guidelines reforms in
the states and in the federal courts. Greater emphasis
will be placed on the Minnesota Guidelines because
they have been in effect longer than any other fullydeveloped guidelines system, and have been subject to
the most extensive monitoring and outside evaluation.'
The idea of sentencing guidelines overseen by a
permanent sentencing commission was originally proposed by federal judge Marvin Frankel in the early
1970s.2 Several bills to accomplish this were introduced
in Congress, but Minnesota was the first jurisdiction to
place such a system in operation. As of1999, about
one-third of the states had sentencing guidelines in
effect, and guidelines reforms were being considered in
a number of other states. But guidelines systems are not
all alike; some states have attempted to go farther than
Minnesota, while many others have done much less.
Although state guidelines systems are very diverse,
they have a couple of things in common which distinguish them from the federal guidelines. Without exception, state systems are more flexible than the federal
guidelines. There is a range; some state systems are so
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flexible that they are hardly "guidelines" at all, others
are much more restrictive. But anyone who thinks that
sentencing guidelines are inherently inflexible and take
away all discretion would be very mistaken.
Another thing that distinguishes state guidelines is
that they are relatively simple to apply The federal guidelines are quite ambitious; they try to regulate every decision. This is related to the flexibility point, but it goes
beyond that. State guidelines are generally relatively
short documents; sometimes very short. The Minnesota
guidelines commission, for one, has been explicit about
the value of simplicity; it is important to keep guidelines
relatively easy to apply and easy for courts, defendants,
and the public to understand. That is an important point
which was lost in the federal system.
The remainder of this article is organized into five
parts. Part One provides an overview of Guidelines
reforms which have been proposed, adopted, and in
some cases, abolished. The wide variety of guidelines
systems provides a rich source of experience and lawreform options for states considering adopting or revising guidelines. Part Two examines the purposes which
sentencing guidelines are intended to serve, and shows
how those purposes have evolved over time. Part Three
evaluates the extent to which state and federal guidelines reforms have achieved their various purposes. Part
Four examines several persistent challenges faced by
guidelines reforms in all jurisdictions: the lack of
effective controls over prosecutorial discretion and plea
bargaining practices, and the limited attempts to regulate and encourage the use of intermediate sanctions.
Part Five argues that state guidelines, even with their
limitations, are much better than any other sentencing
system which has been tried or proposed. The Conclusion summarizes what we have learned about guidelines in the last two decades.
I. Overview of State and Federal Systems:
Where, When, and What Kinds of Guidelines?
A. Jurisdictions that have, once had, are considering,
or have rejected Guidelines
As shown in the accompanying table, some form of
sentencing guidelines is currently being used in seventeen states and in the federal courts. Furthermore, at
least eight other jurisdictions (listed at the bottom of
the table) are considering the adoption of guidelines. In
1993, the American Bar Association's revised standards
for sentencing strongly endorsed the adoption of sentencing guidelines incorporating all six of the key structural features listed in the table.'

VOL.

12,

NO.

2

-

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER

1999

RICHARD S.
FRASE
Richard S. Frase is the
Benjamin N. Berger
Professor of Criminal
Law at the University of
Minnesota. This article
is an expanded version
of a lecture delivered in
Minneapolis on September 7. 1999, on the
occasion of Professor
Frase's reappointment
to the Berger chair. An
abbreviated version of
the lecture was given
on January 14, 2000 at
a conference on state
and federal guidelines,
and appears in volume
44 of the St. Louis University Law Journal.
Questions, comments,
and factual corrections
are very welcome, and
should be addressed to
Professor Frase at:
fraseO01@
maroon.tc.umn.edu

B. Not all Guidelines are Alike-Major variations
The accompanying table indicates some of most important structural differences among guidelines systems,
but there are actually many more variations. For
instance, Delaware, Florida, and Ohio don't use a grid
(although their "narrative" or "point-system" guidelines
could be translated into a grid). State and federal grids
vary considerably in such things as: whether certain
offenses have a separate grid; the number of grid cells;
the breadth of cell ranges; and whether the ranges of
adjoining cells overlap. Guidelines systems also differ
in the number of disposition options permitted for a
given case (e.g., prison, jail, restrictive intermediate
sanctions, etc.); whether any guidance is offered as to
the choice among sentencing purposes; how criminal
history is defined; how multiple offenses are sentenced;
and the extent to which the sentencing commission has
made independent judgments about appropriate sentences (so-called "prescriptive" rules), rather than simply compiling guidelines which are descriptive of past
judicial and paroling practices.

Guidelines have suffered some defeats, however.
Although the number of guidelines systems has grown
steadily, at least six states have considered and rejected
the idea of sentencing guidelines. Moreover, two states
(Louisiana and Wisconsin) formerly had guidelines but
then repealed them, and three other states have substantially weakened their guidelines. Oregon voters
approved a ballot measure which turned many of the
recommended guideline prison sentences into mandatory minimum prison terms, and the legislature
replaced the sentencing commission with a citizen
"policy" board; Florida and Tennessee abolished their
commissions completely. Moreover, Florida's remaining "guidelines" no longer limit judicial severity: trial
judges have complete discretion to impose any sentence between the recommended guidelines term and
the statutory maximum, whereas sentences below the
guidelines still require a written statement of reasons,
and are appealable by the prosecution.

Summary of Sentencing Guidelines Systems (Fall 1999)
MAJOR STRUCTURAL FEATURES
Initial

Permanent

Parole

Effective

Resource-

Incorporates

Also Covers

Effective

Sentencing

Release

Appellate

Impact

Intermediate

Misdemeanor

Jurisdiction

Date

Commission

Abolished

Review

Assessments

Sanctions

Offenses

(1983)

(some)

(1993)

Utah

1/79

Alaska

1/1/80

Minnesota

5/1/80

/

Pennsylvania

7/22/82

/

Maryland

7/1/83

(1996)

Florida

10/1/83

(until 1998)

Michigan

1/17/84

(1995)

Washington

7/1/84

/

/

Delaware

10/10/87

,1

(1990)

Federal

11/1/87

/

/

Oregon

11/1/89

/

,

Tennessee

11/1/89

(until 1995)

Virginia

1/1/91

(1994)

/

(mostly)

/

/

/

(1994)

(some)

/
(some, 1999)

(1999?)

(1994-98)
(1999)

/

,

(some)

/

/

(some)

/

,/

/

/

(some)

(some)

/

,1

(until 1995)
(1995)

(1995)

ABA Sentencing Standards (3rd ed.)
2/93

.1

/

/

/

Kansas

7/1/93

/

/

/

/

Arkansas

1/1/94

/

North Carolina 10/1/94

/

Ohio

7/1/96

./

Missouri

3/97

/

/
(mostly)

/

/

/

/

(some)

/

/

(some)

/

/

/

Under consideration: Alabama, Georgia, Iowa, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Washington, D.C., & Wisconsin
Considered and rejected guidelines: Connecticut, Maine, Texas, Colorado, New York, & Montana
Guidelines implemented and later repealed: Louisiana (1992-95) & Wisconsin (1985-95)
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Three guidelines states lack a permanent sentencing commission. Alaska's guidelines were created by
statute, and have been greatly expanded by appellate
caselaw; the guidelines in Florida and Tennessee were
written by commissions that were later abolished. Utah
and three other states initially did not have a permanent
sentencing commission. State sentencing commissions
vary considerably in their makeup, but most of them
are larger and more widely representative (e.g., including attorneys and probation officials) than the federal
commission. The duties, staffing, and budget of sentencing commissions varies a lot. However, an essential
component of guidelines is a commission that can do
research on past sentencing practices, evaluate the use
of resources, and prioritize the use of those resources.
Perhaps most importantly, a commission can predict
and seek to avoid prison overcrowding (a function
which I will say more about in a moment). In short: a
permanent sentencing commission is now generally
seen as an essential component of guidelines.
Guidelines systems also differ greatly in their
scope. The most important differences relate to parole:
six states (Utah, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Tennessee,
Arkansas, and Missouri) retain parole release discretion
for all offenses, and have only adopted guidelines to
structure judges' sentencing decisions. Two states
(Alaska and Michigan) retain parole for a substantial
number of crimes. Some guidelines states retain parole
only for a few, very serious offenses, usually those subject to life imprisonment. Ohio has a judicial releasing
option. In short: abolition of parole release is apparently
not seen as an essential feature of state guidelines,
although it has become more common in recent years.
Another important structural feature has to do
with whether guidelines rules are legally enforceable that is, binding on trial courts, and subject to effective
appellate review. Six states (Utah, Maryland, Delaware,
Virginia, Arkansas and Missouri) explicitly provide that
their guidelines are "voluntary" and not subject to
appeal. In Pennsylvania, sentence appeal is available,
but appeals have almost no impact due to the lax standard of review. In North Carolina, the guidelines are
very strict as to some sentencing issues but very loose
as to others, and there is almost no appellate caselaw.
Sentencing caselaw is limited in Tennessee, due in part
to very broad guidelines ranges and retention of parole.
In Florida and Ohio, some decisions applying the
guidelines are appealable, and some are not. To summarize: effective appellate review is found in less than
half of the state guidelines systems.
The next column shown in the table indicates
which jurisdictions have required their sentencing
commission or some other state agency to assess the
resource-impact of proposed sentencing guidelines and
statutes, in particular, the predicted effect on prison
populations. Impact-assessment is more accurate under
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guidelines, because guidelines sentences are more uniform and predictable. Such assessment has always
been a key feature of the Minnesota Guidelines, but it
was lacking in most other early systems. In later years,
however, as state prison populations began to shoot up,
increasing costs and raising problems of overcrowding
and court intervention, more and more states began to
see resource-impact analysis as an essential feature of
guidelines - and indeed, a major reason to adopt guidelines and a sentencing commission. Almost every new
guidelines system created since the mid-i98os has
required resource-impact studies, and several older systems have added this feature (which is also recommended by the revised ABA Standards). It must be
stressed, however, that guidelines systems use
resource-impact studies in very different ways. Some,
like Minnesota, use these studies to shape sentencing
policy; if the impact projections show that a proposed
guideline rule or statute will substantially increase
prison populations, that proposal is likely to be rejected
or greatly narrowed in scope. But other systems, such
as the federal one, generally use resource-impact studies only after the rules have been written - that is, as a
warning to the legislature to expand prison capacity in
order to accommodate the new rules.
The next-to-last column in the table shows which
systems have attempted in some way to structure decisions on the use of intermediate sanctions - that is,
sentences which are less severe than imprisonment but
more restrictive than standard probation, such as residential or outpatient treatment, home detention, intensive supervision, drug- and alcohol-use monitoring,
community service, restitution, and fines. The earliest
guideline systems only regulated prison decisions, that
is, who should go to prison and for how long; nonprison sentences were left to the judges. This is still
true of Minnesota, where non-prison sentences are
given in almost 8o percent of felony cases (and where
almost all jail sentences, which can be for up to one
year, are not regulated by the Guidelines). This is a
good example of how even a system that is fairly ambitious about regulating discretion can still retain a lot of
flexibility. However, since the mid-I98os, more and
more guidelines systems have incorporated intermediate sanctions, and this is also recommended by the
revised ABA standards. This trend, like the growth in
resource-impact analysis, probably reflects rising prison
populations, and a desire to encourage judges to consider effective non-custodial sentencing options. Nevertheless, only about half of existing guidelines systems
attempt to regulate intermediate sanctions. I will return
to this topic later in this article.
The far right-hand column in the table shows the
systems which have guidelines to regulate misdemeanors as well as felonies. Only five jurisdictions (and
the ABA Standards) propose guidelines for misde-
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meanors (or at least, the more serious ones). Perhaps
surprisingly, there does not seem to be a strong correlation between the attempt to regulate intermediate sanctions and the decision to promulgate misdemeanor
guidelines - even though intermediate sanctions would
seem to be especially appropriate for less serious cases.
Of course, there are also many inmates in state prison
who are appropriate candidates for intermediate sanctions. The judicial sentencing seminars pioneered at
Yale by Dan Freed, and now being conducted at a number of other law schools, have been helping judges
explore these issues; the cases discussed in these seminars suggest that there are many people in state prisons
who really don't need to be there. The same is undoubtedly true of federal prisons.
The table as a whole identifies a number of
"strong" guidelines systems - those with at least four of
the key features referred to above. These systems
include Minnesota, Washington, Delaware, the federal
system, Oregon, Kansas, and North Carolina. At the
other extreme are very "weak" systems - those with no
more than two of these key features, such as Maryland
(which recently reexamined its approach, but decided
not to make any major changes), Alaska, and Tennessee. However, these variations do not necessarily
mean that the weaker forms of sentencing guidelines
are always wrong. Perhaps a less ambitious guidelines
reform is all that some states are able to enact; under
these circumstances, it may be that some form of guidelines is better than none. Moreover, several jurisdictions
(e.g., Virginia) began with weak guidelines, then substantially upgraded them. On the other hand, weaker
guidelines do appear to be more vulnerable to being
partially or entirely repealed. The two total-repeal states
(Louisiana and Wisconsin) both had voluntary guidelines for judges, retained parole, and were missing at
least one other key feature shown in the table. The two
states (Florida and Tennessee) that abolished their sentencing commissions were also both relatively weak
systems. Finally, it is not necessarily the case that relatively strong systems are always better; there are a number of major problems (discussed further in Part III)
with the relatively "strong" federal guidelines.
II. The Changing Purposes of Sentencing Guidelines
What were the original goals of guidelines reforms, and
how have these goals evolved over time? The initial
goals provide familiar but important background - we
have to know where we've been, and how we got here,
in order to evaluate the present situation and our
options for the future. In particular, we need to recognize when supposedly new sentencing reforms are
actually just "re-runs" of old ideas -we don't want to
make the same mistakes all over again. At the same
time, we also need to recognize that the goals of sentencing reform have evolved over time. These changes
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show how guidelines have responded to new as well as
old policy concerns, all of which must be accommodated in any successful sentencing system.
A. Initial goals
The original goals of sentencing guidelines reforms
were two-fold. First, to reduce sentencing discretion
and its resulting disparities; and second, to promote
more rational sentencing policy developed and monitored by a specialized sentencing commission.
The goal of disparity reduction was closely tied to a
debate about the purposes which criminal penalties
should be designed to serve. Prior to adoption of sentencing guidelines, the dominant purposes of punishment were rehabilitation (seeking to change the
underlying causes of the defendant's criminal behavior)
and incapacitation (preventing crime by confining dangerous offenders). To achieve these goals, judges and
parole boards were given extremely broad discretion to
individually assess the rehabilitation potential and dangerousness of each offender. Under this "indeterminate" sentencing system, judges could impose any
sentence from probation to the maximum prison term
authorized by law. Most but not all systems required
offenders to serve some fraction of their prison term
before becoming eligible for parole; after that point, the
parole board had unreviewable discretion to decide how
much of the remaining sentence would have to be
served.
In the 197os, a broad, "bi-partisan" consensus
emerged that discretion in sentencing must be substantially reduced. Unregulated discretion was seen as having failed to provide sufficiently certain and severe
punishment to discourage crime and incapacitate dangerous offenders. It also produced unjust disparities in
the treatment of equally serious cases. Studies were
done which showed that when a sentencing file was
given to a group of judges they proposed very different
sentences; it wasn't just that "each case is different."
Many people also came to believe that individualized
assessments of each offender's treatment needs,
progress in treatment, and degree of dangerousness
were too unreliable to justify the disparities they produced, and that most treatment programs could not be
shown to be effective. Broad parole discretion also left
both the public and prisoners themselves with no way
of knowing how long imprisonment would last. Some
observers argued that the solution to all of these problems was a sentencing system based not on crime prevention but upon retribution or "just deserts" - each
offender should be punished in direct proportion to his
or her culpability and the seriousness of the conviction
offense, with little or no consideration given to the
defendant's need for rehabilitation or incapacitation.
The goal of achieving more rational sentencing
policy has two facets. First, the use of an independent,
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appointed commission was designed to insulate sentencing policy decisions from short-term political pressures (and the tendency of elected politicians to prefer
more punitive policies, so as not to appear "soft on
crime"). Second, the commission, like other administrative agencies, was expected to collect data and
develop expertise which would contribute to more
informed sentencing policy. The commissions's database and expertise (and in Minnesota, its mandate to
avoid prison overcrowding), were also expected to promote a more comprehensive, long-term, and fiscally
responsible view - setting sentencing policy for all
crimes (or at least, all felonies), thus avoiding piecemeal
reforms in response to the current "crime of the week,"
and helping to more effectively set priorities for the use
of limited correctional resources.
B. Evolving goals
Since Minnesota's Guidelines first became effective,
sentencing goals and values in Minnesota and other
guidelines jurisdictions have evolved considerably. Of
the original goals summarized above, it appears that the
goal of disparity reduction has become somewhat less
important, while other goals have become more important. In order to achieve all of these goals, many state
guidelines systems have, in effect, adopted a hybrid
sentencing theory sometimes known as "limiting retributivism" (or as it is known in Minnesota, "modified
just deserts"). Under this approach, retributive or "just
deserts" values merely set upper and lower bounds sentences must not be either excessively severe or
unduly lenient. This theory thus defines a range of
"deserved" punishments, within which courts may consider crime-prevention, resource limits, victim and
community concerns, and other appropriate sentencing
goals.4

The evolution in guidelines goals is evident in the
accompanying table. Almost every guidelines system
which was adopted or revised since the mid-i98os has
included resource-impact assessments, in an attempt to
avoid prison overcrowding and control the growth of
prison populations. More recent guideline reforms are
also more likely to regulate and attempt to encourage
the use of intermediate sanctions. Broader use of such
sanctions is intended to reduce unnecessary prison
use - thus avoiding prison over-crowding and reducing
prison costs - and also to better promote public safety.
Here are some of the other important goals which
have been added or given greater emphasis as guidelines reforms have evolved over the past two decades.
Truth in Sentencing. Although this term has several meanings, the most common refers to the goal of
ensuring that offenders serve a high percentage of the
prison sentence imposed by the court, and are not
released early by parole or prison officials. In one sense,
truth in sentencing was always part of guidelines
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reforms which included the abolition of parole release
discretion. But truth in sentencing has come to mean
abolishing parole, period - whether or not judicial sentencing guidelines are enacted. Moreover, the emphasis
has shifted from disparity-reduction to systemic "honesty" and increased sentence severity. Thus, whereas
several early guidelines reforms including abolition of
parole allowed offenders to receive a subsequent sentence reduction of up to thirty-three percent for good
conduct in prison, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and an increasing number of states - define "Truth in
Sentencing" so that offenders receive a sentence reduction of no more than fifteen percent for good conduct.
Adoption of this definition (and of guidelines which
include abolition of parole) was strongly encouraged by
a '994 federal statute, providing substantial funds for
prison construction to states which abolish parole and
require inmates convicted of serious crimes to serve at
least 85 percent of their sentences. At the same time,
this statute has also encouraged some states to consider
adopting guidelines. The reason is that prisoners in
these states were previously serving a very low proportion of their sentences (sometimes less than twenty percent); with many prisoners now required to serve at
least 85 percent, states are facing the prospect of massive increases in prison populations unless judges can
be persuaded (via guidelines) to lower their sentence
lengths.
Public Safety. The original guidelines emphasis
on "Just Deserts" represented a rejection of the prior
policy of allowing judges and parole boards to make
individualized assessments of each defendant's risk of
re-offending. The goal of public safety was not completely abandoned, however. Judges and corrections
officials in many guideline states were still allowed to
consider offender dangerousness when setting the conditions of probation or post-prison supervised release.
Moreover, recommended prison sentences under sentencing guidelines systems have always given substantial emphasis to the defendant's prior record - a factor
which has very little significance under a "Just Deserts"
theory, which assumes that the defendant has already
"paid" for his prior convictions. The extent of the defendant's prior record is primarily important as an indicator of his probable degree of dangerousness and
amenability to treatment or supervision. But guidelines
systems prefer to make these assessments on the basis
of group or actuarial risk, rather than individualized,
case-by-case diagnoses.
However, these limited forms of risk assessment
and risk management were not enough to satisfy
judges, legislators, and the public. In Minnesota and
most other guidelines systems, public safety has
become an increasingly important goal. Thus, in 1989
the Minnesota Legislature amended the Guidelines
enabling statute to specify that public safety should be
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the Commission's "primary" consideration in enacting
or modifying Guidelines provisions. The Legislature
has also enacted a series of laws authorizing or mandating increased penalties for certain dangerous or repeat
offenders. As for other guidelines jurisdictions, some
explicitly included public safety as a goal (e.g., Ohio and
Virginia), and newer guidelines systems are likely to
incorporate recidivist and "dangerous offender" provisions, especially for sex crimes. (Of course, guidelines
systems which retain parole release discretion allow
case-specific dangerousness assessments of all imprisoned offenders.)
Rehabilitation and Reintegration. As with Public
Safety concerns, rehabilitative goals were initially deemphasized under most sentencing guidelines
reforms, but they never went away entirely; in some
systems they remained quite important, and may have
become more so over time. In Minnesota, for example,
rehabilitation is a very important goal - the state is
sometimes called the "land of io,ooo treatment centers" rather than io,ooo lakes. Rehabilitation and reintegration (through community-based sentencing) are
pursued by varying the conditions of probation; nonprison sentences are not regulated under the Minnesota
guidelines, and account for almost 8o percent of felony
sentences. In addition, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has held that, when judges are deciding whether to
depart from presumptive prison or probation sentences,
they may consider the defendant's particular
.amenability" to probation - a concept which at least
implicitly includes assessments of rehabilitation potential (as well as public safety).6 Similar "amenability"
concepts are found in the departure standards of other
states' guidelines systems, for example, in Ohio and
North Carolina. In '993, the Minnesota Legislature also
repealed the provision in the 1978 guidelines enabling
act which had required prison treatment programs to
be entirely voluntary; corrections officials are now
authorized to withhold "good time" credits from
offenders who refuse to participate in prison programs.
Restorative and Community Justice. The past
twenty years have witnessed a substantial growth in
programs designed to give greater attention to the
needs and perspectives of crime victims, the local community, or both. 7 Sentencing alternatives such as victim-offender mediation, restitution, and community
service have become increasingly popular in Minnesota
and other guidelines states. Guidelines systems have
yet to formally recognize such programs and sentencing alternatives, but as I will explain later, most state
systems readily accommodate these new ideas. Again if you have a more flexible guideline system, it can
incorporate a number of different theories.
Rewarding guilty pleas and other forms of cooperation. All sentencing guidelines systems appear to
recognize the need to encourage defendants to cooper-
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ate by pleading guilty, providing testimony against
other offenders, obeying conditions of probation, and
maintaining good conduct in prison. All of these forms
of cooperation are "purchased" by giving defendants
less than their authorized guidelines sentence. Here
again, competing, practical goals require a flexible
rather than a strict conception of "just deserts," that is, a
theory of "limiting retributivism" which permits a
range of penalties. Plea-bargaining practices have not
changed much under the Minnesota guidelines' or, I
believe, under most other state guidelines. A guilty plea,
including an agreement of the parties about the most
appropriate sentence, is a basis in Minnesota, and in
most if not all state guideline systems, to depart from
the guidelines. Of course, allowing such agreed departures risks undercutting the guidelines. (For further discussion see Part IV, infra.)
Broadly-shared Sentencing Power. Public officials
and sentencing scholars have increasingly viewed sentencing as an exercise in shared authority, seeking to
achieve a workable and stable balance between the roles
and influence of a wide variety of public and private
parties? Lawmakers often view sentencing guidelines
as a way to re-assert legislative control over sentencing
(albeit indirectly, through the legislatively-appointed
commission); under indeterminate sentencing
regimes, the input of lawmakers is limited to deciding
what should be criminal, the maximum penalty, and
whether a mandatory minimum penalty should apply.
Similarly, trial judges often support sentencing guidelines which include abolition of parole; under indeterminate sentencing, the judge's sentence has very little
effect over how long offenders stay in prison. Welldesigned sentencing guidelines can also provide appropriate policy-making and/or case-level roles for the
sentencing commission, victims and community representatives, probation officers, and appellate courts. On
the other hand, strict sentencing guidelines have the
potential to upset the balance of sentencing power; legislators, judges, and scholars in some guidelines systems fear that charging and plea bargaining practices
allow the parties, and particularly the prosecution, to
have too much influence on the form or severity of the
sentence - a problem to which I will return in a
moment.
Simplicity. The number and variety of sentencing
goals listed above naturally tends to make the drafting
and implementation of guidelines more difficult. Yet
Minnesota and most state guidelines drafters have recognized that effective guideline standards and procedures must remain relatively simple. The public and
offenders must be able to understand the standards, and
both the standards and sentencing procedures must
remain fairly easy for courts and other officials to apply.
Highly complex rules promote errors, and more disparity; they also waste scarce court and attorney time.
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To summarize, early guidelines reforms attempted
to narrow the focus of sentencing to strongly emphasize uniformity and "just deserts," while seeking to promote more rational sentencing policy. The much
broader range of contemporary sentencing goals
demonstrates an important underlying truth which
early guidelines reforms (and some recent proposals)
seem to have overlooked: sentencing policy is very complex, requiring compromise and careful balancing of
numerous, often-competing goals. Yet the basic principles and rules must remain fairly easy for the public
and system actors to understand and apply. Designing a
workable system to achieve all of these goals and values
is not a simple task!
Ill.What have Guidelines accomplished?
How well have state guidelines achieved the goals
identified above? Any such assessment must begin
with a frank admission: no "expert" on sentencing
guidelines can say very much about how most state
guidelines systems have worked in practice. In some
cases, this is because a state's system is too new to have
generated enough data for evaluation. In other cases,
the guidelines commission has not published or commissioned any evaluations, nor is there some professor
or other outside researcher who takes a special interest
in that state's guidelines. So much of what follows is
based on a few, well-documented systems, and some
"educated guesswork" about the rest.
Disparity reduction. Since most guidelines systems
have abolished parole, they have eliminated that form of
disparity. Judicial sentencing disparities have also been
reduced, at least in the states which have been evaluated.
Minnesota is the only system to have been subjected to
extensive outside evaluation, but data reported by sentencing commissions or their staff suggest that disparity
has also been reduced in Delaware, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Washington." Two of these five jurisdictions do
not have legally-binding guidelines (Delaware's are formally voluntary, and Pennsylvania's lack effective appellate review). Although much more research is needed on
this point, it may be that voluntary judicial guidelines
can still be effective to reduce disparity -provided that
certain other factors are present. Delaware is a very
small state, with substantial informal "peer" pressure on
judges to conform to the guidelines. Pennsylvania has
had a very active sentencing commission.
More rational sentencing policy. As shown in the
table, most guidelines systems include a permanent sentencing commission. Although some are more active
than others, all of these commissions have begun to
develop useful sentencing policy expertise, a comprehensive statewide view of punishment priorities, better
management of resources, and a long-term perspective.
Even in states with fairly weak guidelines, sentencing
commissions can play an important role, not just in
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draffing guidelines but also by advising the legislature as
to various sentencing policy matters of current concern.
As for the increasingly important goal of resourceimpact assessment, there is considerable evidence that
sentencing guidelines can help to avoid prison overcrowding and the kinds of dramatic (and very expensive) escalation in prison populations which has
occurred in many non-guidelines states in the past 20
years. Minnesota pioneered this concept, and has successfully avoided major prison overcrowding problems
for almost two decades - a period in which most nonguidelines states experienced both overcrowding and
court intervention. Although Minnesota's prison population has increased substantially since 1979, the average annual rate of growth (about 5 percent per year) has
only been about two-thirds the rate for the nation as a
whole (8 percent per year). Other guidelines jurisdictions which emphasized resource-management goals
have also had low average annual growth rates, comparable to Minnesota's. But average growth rates in guidelines systems without these goals were higher (7
percent), and one of the highest average rates of prison
population growth in any system, with or without
guidelines, occurred in the federal system - about 9
percent per year.
Two other goals closely related to the goal of
resource management are the development of detailed
sentencing and correctional databases, and the promotion of greater use of intermediate sanctions. Improved
data permits more accurate prison population forecasts,
and more informed sentencing policy formulation.
Guidelines jurisdictions now possess by far the best
system-wide data on sentencing practices and correctional populations. When it comes to the promotion of
intermediate sanctions, however, sentencing guidelines
reforms have accomplished relatively little. This topic is
discussed further in Part IV.
Another goal of rational sentencing policy is
effective appellate review, including a sufficient body of
caselaw to enforce guidelines rules, clarify ambiguities,
and develop sentencing policy through the time-honored, "common law" method. Many guidelines systems
(Alaska, Minnesota, Washington, the Federal courts,
Oregon, and Kansas) have achieved a substantial body
of appellate case law. However, some observers believe
that appellate review in the federal courts has gone too
far, unduly limiting trial court flexibility."
Truth in Sentencing. Any system which has abolished parole release discretion- as the majority of
guidelines systems have done - has achieved a greater
degree of "truth in sentencing." Of course, this goal has
also been achieved in a number of states which abolished parole without adopting judicial sentencing
guidelines. However, there is reason to believe that the
abolition of parole works much better in a system with
such guidelines, for three reasons. First, systems with
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judicial guidelines have less need to rely on state-wide
parole standards as a means of reducing disparity in the
sentences imposed by local judges. Second, judicial
guidelines can be used to encourage judges to lower
their sentence lengths, to reflect the much higher proportion of the prison term which will be served after
parole is abolished (and thus avoid massive increases in
prison populations). Third, systems with guidelines
and a permanent sentencing commission are in a better
position to predict the effects abolition of parole will
have on prison populations; such systems can then
either build more prisons, modify the guidelines to
lower prison commitment or duration rates, or pursue
a combination of these strategies. In contrast, the abolition of parole, in a system without judicial guidelines,
eliminates a means of counteracting judicial disparity
and prison overcrowding at the "back end" of the sentencing process, without providing any means of controlling these problems from the "front end."
Public Safety. States with sentencing guidelines
have generally had stable or falling crime rates since
their guidelines became effective. However, crime rates
have recently been stable or falling in most states, with
or without guidelines. And, of course, crime rates
depend on many social and economic factors in addition to sentencing policy; a thorough examination of
the relationship between guidelines and public safety
would thus be very complex (and has not, to my knowledge, been attempted by quantitative criminologists).
But the stable or falling pattern of crime rates, noted
above, at least suggests that sentencing guidelines do
not threaten public safety.
Other goals. As for the other goals of guidelines
reforms described previously, some guidelines systems
have been particularly successful. The Minnesota
Guidelines have achieved greater uniformity, proportionality, and Truth-in-Sentencing, while retaining
enough flexibility to take account of unusual offender
characteristics and rehabilitation potential, local values
and resource limits, and emerging punishment theories such as restorative justice." By giving strong priority to the use of state prison space for violent and repeat
offenders, while emphasizing jail and other community-based sanctions for less serious cases, the Guidelines promote public safety while avoiding prison
overcrowding and unnecessary incarceration. Finally,
the Minnesota Guidelines allow sentencing policy to be
significantly influenced by each of the major actors and
stakeholders: the legislature, the Commission, trial and
appellate courts, the prosecution and defense, crime victims and community groups, probation officers, and
prison officials. At the same time, the Minnesota Guidelines remain fairly simple to understand and to apply.
Other state guidelines systems have not been as
thoroughly evaluated as Minnesota's, but what we do
know about them suggests that many of them have also
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achieved a good balance in the areas described above.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about the Federal Guidelines. There have been a number of problems, some of which have already been noted.
First, federal appellate review has been very active,
depriving trials courts of needed flexibility.
Second, the U.S. Sentencing Commission did not
adopt resource management as a goal; thus, federal
prisons have remained seriously overcrowded, and federal prison population growth has been higher than the
national average - and much higher than in guidelines
jurisdictions which emphasized resource management.
Third, the federal guidelines provide only limited
scope for and encouragement of the use of intermediate
sanctions, and only specifically incorporate options
which are alternative forms of custody (community and
intermittent confinement, and home detention).
Fourth, the Federal Guidelines not only permit, but
often require, judges to enhance sentences based on
conduct which was not charged, or for which charges
led to dismissal or even acquittal; although some state
guidelines systems include occasional elements of
"real-offense" sentencing, no state system permits nonconviction-offense factors to play a substantial a role.
Fifth, the federal system includes a number of
severe mandatory minimum penalties and related
guidelines provisions which, in the view of many federal
judges, often result in unreasonably severe sentences.
Finally, the federal guidelines are NOT "simple" the federal Guidelines Manual currently runs to over
400 pages in the West version (not counting appendices); the length of the Minnesota Guidelines, at about
65 pages, is typical of most state systems. These
differences are not due simply to the greater number or
diversity of federal crimes; the length and complexity of
the federal guidelines result from the manner in which
federal sentencing decisions are regulated.
To summarize: the federal guidelines are not wellbalanced; they contain a number of very problematic
rules, lack desirable features found in many state systems, and have sparked far more criticism than most
state guidelines systems.
IV.Two Persistent challenges
Despite the accomplishments of many state guidelines,
there are a number of legitimate criticisms which can
be leveled at even the best of these systems. Two of the
most important problems are the failure to effectively
regulate prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining;
and the limited efforts to regulate and encourage the
3
use of non-custodial ("intermediate") sanctions.
Although each of these "gaps"in guidelines coverage is
a problem, neither is a major problem in well-designed
systems; indeed they may even be strengths, helping
these systems accommodate important contemporary
sentencing goals and values.

NO. 2

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER

1999

A. Prosecutorial Discretion and Plea Bargaining
Prosecutors in every American jurisdiction wield enormous "sentencing" power, because they have virtually
unreviewable discretion to select the initial charges and
decide which charges to drop as part of plea bargaining.
Since guidelines limit the range of sentences available
for a given offense, the power to drop or not drop
charges is the power to select the sentence range available to the court (that is, what "box" on the grid the case
ends up in). Thus, any disparity in charging translates
into disparity in sentencing. Unregulated charging and
plea bargaining also make it more difficult for the sentencing commission to predict future resource needs.
Yet no guidelines system has come up with an effective
way of structuring prosecutorial sentencing power, and
its potential for disparity and unpredictability Washington has state-wide charging guidelines, but they are not
legally enforceable. The federal Guidelines tried to mitigate this problem by requiring trial courts to consider
certain alleged criminal acts ("relevant conduct")
whether or not such acts were included in any conviction offense. But this essentially lawless approach goes
too far in the opposite direction - allowing sentences to
be based on weak charges which were properly dismissed, resulted in acquittal, or were never even filed.
What should be done? Clearly efforts to structure
prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining should
continue, especially by means of internal, administrative measures within prosecutor's offices, such as written policies and review of decisions by supervising
staff. But we should not expect any major "breakthroughs" in the near future. The absence, in all state
guidelines systems, of any serious attempt to externally
regulate prosecutorial decisions reflects the extraordinary difficulty of enforcing such controls in an adversary system. This may yet be possible, but it will be very
difficult - especially to impose lower limits on charge
and recommended-sentence severity (since, in most
cases, neither prosecutors nor defendants will appeal
cases of prosecution leniency).
However, I believe that most state guidelines systems are valuable reforms even if prosecutorial decisions remain substantially unregulated. I have two
reasons for this belief. First, the absence of widespread
complaints about prosecutorial dominance in state
guidelines systems is an important sign, suggesting
that closer regulation may not be needed. Specifically, I
am suggesting that, in a properly balanced guidelines
system - that is, one with reasonable sentence severity
levels and few mandatory minimum statutes, in which
courts retain substantial sentencing discretion for any
given offense (due to broad guidelines ranges, limited
appellate scrutiny, and/or flexible departure powers) - it
is rare that prosecutorial decisions will produce sentences which judges strongly disapprove, yet are powerless to prevent (as often seems to occur in federal
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courts). Second, prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining are valuable sources of flexibility and moderation in sentencing. These discretionary powers permit
systems to consider individual offense and offender factors which may not fit squarely within formal statutory
and guidelines rules. And of course, prosecutorial discretion also allows systems to tailor sentencing severity
to the available resources and evidence.
B. Intermediate Sanctions
Only a few guidelines jurisdictions have attempted to
regulate the conditions of non-custodial sanctions, or
even to encourage broader use of such sanctions. Even
the few jurisdictions which have attempted to address
these issues have not gone very far. Several systems
authorize judges, in certain cases, to substitute
specified amounts of certain intermediate sanctions for
custody; for example, sixteen hours of community service, or a day of home detention, might be substituted
for a day of custody. Two states, Pennsylvania and North
Carolina, have attempted to define large groups of
offenders for whom various kinds of intermediate sanctions are appropriate. These guidelines first classify
penalties into three types: incarceration (prison or jail),
severe intermediate sanctions (such as residential treatment), and mild intermediate sanctions (such as community service). In some cells of the guidelines grid,
only the most severe or the most lenient sanction type
is authorized; in other cells, the sentencing judge is
given the option of selecting among two (or even all
three) of these sanction types.
The approach just described encourages judges to
think about alternatives to custody, and discourages
them from imposing severe intermediate sanctions in
very minor cases. But the Pennsylvania and North Carolina Guidelines provide no guidance as to the choice to
be made, when more than one sanction type is allowed
in a given cell, or (when a non-custodial option is chosen), how much of that option to impose (for instance,
what length of home detention or community service).
These two systems also provide little guidance for the
use of intermediate sanctions in response to violations
of the conditions of probation or post-prison release.
Revocations of conditional release account for a high
proportion of state prison admissions in many states;
judges and correctional authorities need a range of
structured sanctions at the back end of the sentencing
process, as well as at the front end.
Should all guidelines jurisdictions develop detailed
rules to regulate and encourage the use of intermediate
sanctions? Perhaps, but only if certain conditions are
met. The following questions need to be asked:
i. Are various intermediate sanctions available in most
parts of the state, and are they adequately funded? A
number of guidelines states (Pennsylvania, North
Carolina, and Ohio) have sought to encourage
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broader use of intermediate sanctions through
increased state funding for community corrections.
2. Is there fairly broad field support for such guidelines? In Minnesota, proposals to add any type of
intermediate sanction guidelines have been met
with widespread resistance from attorneys, judges,
and probation officers. And Minnesota's experience
has shown that, where field resistance is high,
Guidelines rules have been widely evaded.
3. Assuming sufficient funding and field support, what
is the probable impact of wider use of intermediate
sanctions on prison and jail populations? Prior experience with other "middle options" such as pretrial
diversion and boot camp suggests that broader use
of restrictive intermediate sanctions might not
greatly reduce custody populations, and could even
increase them. Many of the offenders who receive
these new sanctions would previously have received
less onerousness release conditions; any increase in
the number or intensity of release conditions
inevitably means an increase in the frequency of violations, and thus at least some increase in prison or
jail commitment rates.
4. Are this jurisdiction's guidelines already fairly
detailed? Rules governing the use of intermediate
sanctions make guidelines more complex, yet a
major goal of most state guidelines reforms has
been simplicity of application. As was suggested
previously, simplicity promotes better public and
offender understanding and acceptance of the rules,
and reduces errors of application. At some point, the
cost of further complexity outweighs any added
benefits. This is particularly likely to be true in the
sentencing of less serious offenses.
5. How much importance does this jurisdiction place
on non-retributive sentencing goals? Flexibility in
the imposition of probation conditions permits
greater individualization (to achieve crime-preventive goals), and a greater degree of "local control" (so
that sentencing policy and the use of local resources
may reflect important variations in local values and
traditions). Such flexibility also allows sentences to
more easily incorporate Restorative and Community
Justice goals.
In light of the considerations listed above, detailed
guidelines for intermediate sanctions may make more
sense in some jurisdictions than in others; moreover,
such guidelines inevitably make it more difficult to
achieve a number of competing sentencing goals. Nevertheless, all guidelines systems can and should seek to
develop standards - and resources - to promote
increased and more effective use of intermediate sanctions. Even if detailed intermediate sanction guidelines
are not deemed feasible or desirable, efforts should be
made to develop general "equivalency scales" between
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days of custody and various intermediate sanctions.
Such scales preserve judicial discretion, while encouraging judges to substitute intermediate sanctions for
custody, and guiding them in the choice of specific
sanction amounts.
V. What's the Alternative? Comparing Guidelines to
Other Systems, Past, Present and Future
While even the best state guidelines systems have their
problems, and there is always room for improvement,
supporters of guidelines sentencing should not be too
defensive. This section briefly reviews the principal alternative ways of designing a sentencing system which have
already been tried, or which have been recently proposed.
Compared to each of these alternatives, state guidelines
are better - sometimes much better. And the reason can
be summed up in a single word - balance. This is also
the main reason why state systems have achieved
broader acceptance than the federal guidelines.t
A. Indeterminate Sentencing (and common variations)
Before there were guidelines, sentencing in all states
was almost completely lawless - judges had broad,
unregulated discretion to decide what sentence to
impose, and parole boards had equally broad discretion
to decide how much of an imposed prison sentence had
to be served. This system is the one which is still being
used in the majority of states (combined to a greater or
lesser extent with mandatory penalties for selected
crimes, discussed below).
Indeterminate sentencing is no better now than it
was twenty-five years ago, when Minnesota and other
guidelines states began to reject it. There is no reason to
go back to it; we've "been there, and done that." Completely unregulated sentencing discretion cannot be
justified in a modem system of justice governed by the
rule of law; a defendant's sentence should not vary dramatically, depending on which judge happens to hear
the case, or how a parole board predicts the defendant's
future. A properly-designed and balanced guidelines
system can structure discretion without eliminating it.
Even voluntary or loosely-enforced guidelines give
judges and attorneys a valuable "starting point" in each
case, and also promote more rational, state-wide formulation of sentencing policy. Guidelines help to manage
state correctional resources and avoid prison overcrowding at the "front end;" these effects are much
harder to achieve under an indeterminate sentencing
system, because sentences are less predictable. When
overcrowding occurs in such a system, prisoners must
be released early, thus undercutting truth in sentencing
goals. And of course, no system of indeterminate sentencing regulates prosecutorial discretion, plea bargaining, and intermediate sanctions.
A recent monograph argues that indeterminate
sentencing has several advantages over "structured sen-
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tencing" (including guidelines).'" Those supposed
advantages include: sentencing tailored to case-specific
facts, by expert officials in direct contact with the case;
recognition of the goals of rehabilitation, public safety,
and community/restorative justice; insulation from
public emotion; and facilitation of prison population
management. As has been emphasized throughout this
article, all of these goals can be substantially achieved in
a well-designed guidelines system, while at the same
time avoiding the gross disparities and other disadvantages of indeterminate sentencing. Again: sentencing
guidelines are not all alike. Guidelines such as Minnesota's permit substantial exercise of case-level discretion, while still allowing other system actors to play
important roles both at the case level and in shaping
overall sentencing policy. Such guidelines recognize all
traditional and emerging sentencing goals, without
allowing any one goal to dominate the others. They partially insulate sentencing policy formulation from politics, while allowing input from all stake-holders, as well
as open decision-making. And they provide front-end
resource management, thus preserving truth in sentencing values.
Two common "variants" of indeterminate sentencing merit only brief mention. First, a number of states
have adopted "Truth in Sentencing laws" abolishing
parole release discretion -but without adopting judicial
guidelines. This approach is arguably the worst combination of all; as was noted previously, it retains all of the
problems of unregulated judicial discretion, and eliminates one means of limiting judicial disparities. Such
systems also run a much greater risk of sudden, massive increases in prison populations (if judges do not
substantially reduce their sentence durations).
A second variation from the pure indeterminate
sentencing model is much more common (indeed, it is
probably found in every current indeterminate sentencing system, as well as in many guidelines systems) the adoption of mandatory, or mandatory minimum,
sentences for selected crimes. Although such statutes
are designed to reduce sentencing disparity and more
effectively prevent crime, in practice neither goal is reliably achieved; because such statutes are so inflexible
and severe, they are widely (but inconsistently) evaded,
thus making sentencing even more disparate, and
greatly limiting any added crime-control effects.
B. "Legislative-Determinate" sentencing
For a time, in the mid- to late 197os, states were experimenting with direct legislative formulation of case-level
sentencing policy - so-called "determinate sentencing
laws" in which the legislature specified a narrow sentencing range for each offense, with minor adjustments
for aggravating and mitigating circumstances. No such
law has been enacted since the early i98os, presumably
because legislators have realized that it is very difficult
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to specify precise sentence ranges in advance and monitor their implementation, nor does the legislature have
the time or expertise to do this - that is what a sentencing commission is for.
C. Emerging Sentencing Theories
As was noted previously, there has been much more
attention in recent years to the needs and perspectives
of crime victims and the local community. Restorative
and Community Justice programs, such as victimoffender mediation and community service, are rapidly
spreading around the country (and in many other
nations). The approach of these new programs conflicts
with the offense-based, just Deserts model which provides at least the overall structure for most sentencing
guidelines systems. Just Deserts looks backwards- at
the defendant's criminal behavior and its legal and
moral significance. Restorative and Community Justice
theories look forward; they focus on repairing the damage caused by the offense, and preventing its recurrence. In this sense, these new models are closer to
utilitarian, crime-preventive theories of punishment
(particularly rehabilitation), but with greater emphasis
on the needs of the victim and the local community.
Could some combination of Restorative or Community Justice form the basis for an entire sentencing
system and structure, to replace sentencing guidelines?
At this point, it's too early to tell; perhaps some day But
for now, these new theories suffer from the same drawbacks as indeterminate sentencing: without more structure than they now have, they would permit too much
variation and unpredictability of sentences, thus resulting in unacceptable sentencing disparities and very little
ability to manage correctional resources. However, it is
important to note that well-designed guidelines systems
such as Minnesota's retain sufficient flexibility to allow
courts to apply Restorative and Community Justice measures in many cases, especially less serious ones.
The "newest kid on the block," in terms of sentencing theory, might best be labeled "risk-management." The primary goal of sentencing is defined as
public protection, and the task of judges and correctional authorities is to evaluate and manage the degree
of risk which each offender poses to persons, property,
and other important values. In December, 1996, a Governor's Task Force in Wisconsin released a report,
proposing a new state sentencing system based on this
model, and pilot projects have been carried out in sev6
eral Wisconsin counties.'
As with Restorative and Community Justice, it is
too early to tell whether the Risk-Management model
can form a workable basis for an entire sentencing system. The problem with this approach, of course, is that
it requires judges and corrections officials to exercise
broad discretion, in tailoring sentencing and supervision decisions to the needs of each offender. In this
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sense, the new model is very similar to the former,
indeterminate sentencing system; in other words,
we've "been there, done that" too! The major difference
would seem to be that indeterminate sentencing was
based more on the goal of offender rehabilitation (especially in prison), whereas the Risk-Management model
focuses more on containment rather than change of
offenders' criminal tendencies (and on the risk which
the offender poses in his particular community). Again,
do we really want to let sentences vary completely by
risk, unrelated to the offender's culpability and the seriousness of his conviction offense? Do we think judges
and corrections officials are much better at making
individualized assessments today than they were in the
past? Can such a discretionary system still allow the
state to predict future resource needs and manage the
use of limited correctional resources, especially prison
space? What about the value of Truth in Sentencing?
Finally, is it wise to openly cater to the public's fear of
dangerous criminals? To paraphrase Frank Zimring's
criticism of supposedly-limited three-strikes laws offering the public a "limited" or "controlled" program
of offender risk management "is like trying to satisfy a
7
grizzly bear by offering him half your lunch."'
Given these concems, and the current consensus
on sentencing purposes and values, there is reason to
doubt that risk-management sentencing will completely replace sentencing guidelines any time soon.
But again, it is important to note that a well-designed
guidelines system can successfully incorporate elements of risk-management while maintaining an overall structure based on proportionality and predictability.
The Delaware guidelines have long incorporated a
series of sentencing "levels" which correspond in part
to the predicted risk of offender groups, and officials
retain substantial discretion to move offenders up and
down the "ladder" of sanction levels, based on individual assessments or risk. In Virginia, the sentencing
commission is working on two sets of risk-based proposals, to incorporate into that state's Guidelines: one
would help trial judges identify low-risk, non-violent
offenders who are suitable candidates for non-custodial
sentencing alternatives; another set of rules would
identify high-risk, sex offenders who should receive
longer custody terms. In Minnesota, the concept of
"amenability" to probation has long allowed trial courts
to depart from Guidelines prison-commitment rules,
based in part on the offender's risk of failing on probation. And almost all guidelines jurisdictions regularly
permit probation and post-prison-release conditions to
be designed, altered, or revoked, based on assessments
of offender risk.
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Conclusion
After two decades of guidelines reforms, what have we
learned? Here is a short list of the most important
lessons which a review of this experience teaches:
First: guidelines in a number of states have succeeded in improving sentencing policy and practice reducing bias and disparity in sentencing; avoiding
serious prison over-crowding; and ensuring that adequate prison space is available for the most serious
offenders. State guidelines regulate but do not eliminate discretion; almost all of the existing systems leave
plenty of room for the consideration of unique offense
and offender characteristics, crime-preventive as well as
retributive sentencing purposes, local community values and resources, and emerging sentencing theories
such as Restorative and Community Justice. Most state
guidelines systems have abolished parole release discretion, which serves to achieve Truth in Sentencing;
offenders serve most of the sentence imposed by the
trial court, and there is no pretense that sentences are
longer than they really are. State guidelines have
achieved more rational sentencing policy because they
are developed and monitored by an independent, nonpartizan agency charged with the responsibility of collecting detailed data on sentencing practices and
resources, evaluating sentencing policy from a longterm perspective, setting priorities for use of limited
resources, and developing a comprehensive approach to
the sentencing of all crimes, thereby avoiding the problems of piecemeal reforms. Although state sentencing
commissions play a critical role in guidelines systems,
guidelines in Minnesota and most other states allow all
of the other major public and private stakeholders to
have significant input into the development and implementation of state sentencing policy. The Legislature
maintains oversight and ultimate control over major
policy issues, and important roles are also played by
trial and appellate judges, the defense and prosecution,
victims, community representatives, and correctional
officials. And yet - most state guidelines systems
remain relatively simple to understand and apply.
Second: the best state guidelines work better, in all
of the ways described above, than any other sentencing
system which has yet been tried or even proposed.
Quite simply, there is no realistic alternative as a means
of accommodating all of the many important values and
principles which we want sentences to serve. The prior
indeterminate sentencing system permitted intolerable
extremes of disparity; the unpredictable nature of indeterminate sentencing also prevented effective resourcemanagement, and violated the public's desire for Truth
in Sentencing. Similar problems of disparity and unpredictability would arise if any jurisdiction were to base
its sentencing system entirely on a theory of Restorative
or Community Justice, or on a theory of offender Risk
Management. On the other hand, highly "determinate"
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sentencing regimes - narrow, legislatively-fixed sentence ranges for all crimes, or mandatory-minimum
terms for selected offenses - go too far in the opposite
direction, denying needed flexibility and inviting widespread (but inconsistent) evasion. The current trend to
abolish parole release discretion without enacting judicial sentencing guidelines is arguably the worst combination of all, because it eliminates a means of reducing
judicial disparities and prison overcrowding, without
providing any other means of avoiding these problems.
Third: state sentencing guidelines are politically
viable. They have been successfully implemented in
many states, and have survived - in some cases for
almost 20 years, which is a very long time, given the
extreme political salience and volatility of sentencing
issues in recent years. These systems have survived
because they work, and in particular, because they have
managed to incorporate, and strike an acceptable balance between, the diverse values and goals of late
Twentieth Century American sentencing. Of course,
there are no guarantees of success; a number of state
systems have been abandoned, and others have been
substantially weakened. The success of sentencing
guidelines is highly "contingent" as to both place and
time.'8 Looking at the history of state guidelines adoptions, rejections, expansions, contractions, and abolitions, it is difficult to find a simple pattern (although
several factors seem important: a "weak" system to
begin with (Louisiana, Wisconsin), and ballot-box policy making (Oregon)).
Fourth: state guidelines continue to evolve and
improve. Newer systems are more likely to take advantage of the potential which guidelines provide for
resource-management and the promotion and structuring of intermediate sanctions. Most older systems are
better today than when they began, not only because
they have added desirable features (a permanent commission; resource-management; intermediate sanctions) which they originally lacked, but also because
these system now openly recognize and incorporate a
wide variety of sentencing goals and values. Early systems such as Minnesota's were designed to strongly
emphasize "Just Deserts," but we have learned that sentencing is more complex than that. To achieve the goals
of simplicity and rationality, it is tempting to limit our
sentencing purposes to retributive uniformity and proportionality, But no American system has ever adopted
and retained such a narrow approach, and it probably
never will. Nor should it.
Fifth: the development of sentencing guidelines
remains an area of state, not federal leadership. This
reform began in the states; state guidelines have
improved over time more than the federal version; and
most state systems have avoided the strong opposition
which the federal guidelines have evoked among judges
and sentencing scholars. Indeed, the federal contribu-
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tion has largely been negative; states have adopted
guidelines despite the federal example, not because of it
(and have even felt the need to avoid the term "guidelines," because it seemed too closely associated with the
federal version).
Finally: state sentencing guidelines are diverse. No
two systems are alike, and there is no single "model"
which can or even should be universally adopted.
Again, it would nice if sentencing reform was simple if we could just look at the past two decades and say to
legislators in every state: "Do this." But sentencing, perhaps more than any other field of law and public policy,
is closely related to the unique traditions, politics, and
culture of each jurisdiction. I continue to believe that
Minnesota's version is one of the best at balancing and
achieving all of the competing goals and values of sentencing, and that other states should try to adopt it. But
every system must ultimately find its own way. In any
case, the great diversity of guidelines systems provides a
rich menu of reform options and experience to guide
sentencing reformers in other states - and in the federal system- in their efforts to design, implement,
improve, and preserve guidelines systems.
Notes
The principal sources for this summary are: Michael Tonry,
Sentencing Commissions and Their Guidelines, 17 CRIME & JUSTICE137 (1993); Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Still Going Strong, 78 JUDICATURE 173 (1995); Kevin R.
Reitz, The Status of Sentencing Guidelines Reforms in the U.S.,
10(6) OVERCROWDED
TIMES 1 (1999); and various state- specific
reports and evaluations too numerous to cite, collected by
the author. Many of the latter are published either in the FEDERALSENTENCING REPORTER
or in OVERCROWDED
TIMES. See also 20
LAW & POLICY, issues 3 & 4 (1998) (articles on structured sentencing); Bureau of Justice Assistance, National Assessment
of Structured Sentencing (1996); Bureau of Justice Assistance, National Survey of State Sentencing Structures (1998).
Additional information about particular state guidelines systems may be obtained from the contact persons listed on the
web page of the National Association of Sentencing Commissions-http://www.ussc.gov/states/ The Association's
newsletter, also available on this web page, includes reports
on recent state guidelines developments.
MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER
(1973).
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FORCRIMINAL JUSTICE: SEN
D
TENCING, 3 R EDITION (1994). The standards themselves (with-

6

out commentary) are published in 52 CRIM. L. REP 2353
(1993).
The theory of "limiting retributivism" is most often associated with the writings of Professor Norval Morris. For a
detailed analysis of the evolution of sentencing purposes in
Minnesota, resulting in a system very similar to what Morris
proposed, see Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUSTICE 363 (1997).
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
See Frase, supra note 4, at 399-403; see also Richard S.
Frase, Defendant Amenability to Treatment or Probation as a
Basis for Departure Under the Minnesota and Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 3 FED.SENT. R. 328 (1991) (discussing the

VOL.

12,

NO.

2

-

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER

1999

see Richard S. Frase, The Uncertain Future of Sentencing
1, 10-33 (1993).
Guidelines, 12 LAW& INEQUALITY
Richard S. Frase Sentencing Guidelines in the States: Lessons
for State and Federal Reformers, 6 FED.SENT. R. 123, 125-26
(1993) (state guidelines achieve better balance in several
areas: the weight given to different punishment purposes,
and to offense versus offender characteristics; the tradeoff
between uniformity and flexibility; degree of sanction severity; and the allocation of sentencing power between the legislature, the sentencing commission, prosecutors, the defense,
correctional officers, and judges). For further discussion of
the need to balance the influence of various decision makers,
see Franklin E. Zimring, A Consumer's Guide to Sentencing
Reform: Making the Punishment Fit the Crime (Hastings Center
Report, 1976); Kevin R. Reitz, Modeling Discretion in American
Sentencing Systems, 20 LAW & POLICY 389 (1998).
Michael Tonry, Reconsidering Indeterminate and Structured
Sentencing (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,
1999).
16See (Wisconsin) Governor's Task Force on Sentencing and
Corrections, Final Report (1996) [excerpts published in 7
OVERCROWDED
TIMEs 6-19 (1996)]; see also Michael E. Smith &
Walter J. Dickey, Reforming Sentencing and Corrections for Just
Punishment and Public Safety (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs, 1999).
' Franklin E. Zimring, Tough Crime Laws Are False Promises, 7
FED.SENT. R. 61, 62 (1994).
78 See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF

principal Minnesota cases, and contrasting the federal
caselaw at that time).
See, e.g., Leena Kurki, Incorporating Restorative and Community Justice Into American Sentencing and Corrections (U.S.
Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1999).
See Richard S. Frase, Implementing Commission-Based Sentencing Guidelines: The Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL. 279, 316-19 (1993).
See infra note 14, and accompanying text.
10See Tonry, supra note 1, at 153-54. It is possible, of course,
that judicial sentencing disparities were simply replaced by
prosecutorial disparities. Most evaluations of state sentencing guidelines have only examined disparity on the basis of
the conviction offense, since that is what state guideline rules
are based on, but evaluation of prosecutorial disparity
requires analysis of "real offense" data. For some examples
of such analysis, see Frase, supra note 8, at 299-303, 318 n.
93, 321; see also further discussion of charging and plea
bargaining in Part IV, infra.
See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State Experiences,
91 Nw. U. L. REV.1441, 1458-71, 1498 (1998).
12 See generally Frase, supra note 4.
'3

Other common criticisms of guidelines are that they do not
give judges enough discretion (or give them too much); that
guidelines give too much weight to retributive sentencing
goals (or not enough); and that they promote undue sentencing severity (or undue leniency). For a refutation of these
opposing criticisms, as applied to the Minnesota Guidelines,
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